"Mutual Assured Destruction:" Antiquated Doctrine or Viable Military Strategy?
Author: Elena Sakelaris
Mutual assured destruction (“MAD”) is a military strategy
doctrine in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two (or more) opposing sides would bring about the complete destruction of both the attacker and
responder. During the Cold War, the
United States and Soviet Union relied upon the MAD doctrine. MAD
ultimately plays out as a standstill of sorts. Both sides are equally armed and
capable of total destruction of the other—neither side has the incentive to
initiate conflict nor disarm. While there
were times the United States and Soviet Union were on the brink of nuclear
war, and at some points in the conflict tensions were much more escalated such
as the Cuban
Missile Crisis, it never reached the point of actual launch. Rather than utilizing nuclear weapons for
their destructive purpose, both sides used them for political leverage during
the Cold War. Nuclear weapons
fundamentally changed the character of war; the question is no longer one of
victory or loss, but rather survival or total annihilation. However, rational
leaders in the United States and Soviet Union remained unwilling to bring about
the total destruction of mankind.
It has now been almost 26 years since the official end of
the Cold War in December of 1991;
however we find ourselves yet again facing the potential risks of nuclear war.
A nuclear strike by North Korea or the United States would constitute an act of war. In response to recent threats against the
United States and its allies from North Korea, President Trump stated in his
speech at the UN that the United States would respond with force and “totally
destroy” North Korea if necessary.
This extreme speech is not new, since the tensions have escalated
between the United States, both leaders have respectively issued hyper-aggressive
statements. Since February of this year,
North Korea has
launched 11 missiles. What concerns
many people is the perceived—whether it is true or not is not the subject of
this post—instability of both men. Individuals who tend to be more rash will
generally respond faster and more aggressively than others might have. The
appropriate response to the threats from North Korea is also not the topic of
discussion here. I would argue a response is necessary because Kim Jong Un has
become emboldened and the threats against the United States and its allies
cannot be ignored.
However the point of interest here is that this is a
conflict between two nuclear-armed nations. Unlike the Cold War, the degree of
nuclear capabilities is not remotely close. The United States has a nuclear
arsenal incomparable to that of North Korea’s arsenal. This raises the question of whether is this truly a
MAD situation? However, the strength of
the arsenal compared to North Korea’s does not diminish the devastation a
nuclear attack against the United States would have. The ability to respond
ten, twenty, fifty times stronger does not mean there will be no suffering in
the United States or among our allies.
Accordingly, the question remains whether MAD is simply an
antiquated principle or can still be effective in preventing nuclear war? In order for MAD’s deterrence to be
effective, a nation’s abilities and powers must be believable. Deterrence is
only effective if other hostile nations do not doubt one’s willingness to use nuclear
weapons if necessary. Nixon’s Foreign Policy Advisor Kissinger presented to
Nixon the “madman” theory which essentially argued that the President could not
be totally predictable: “If everyone knew that the president would never
initiate a nuclear war, then there was no need to take his nuclear posturing
seriously.”[1] President Ronald Reagan famously said before
a radio address in 1984, “My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you
today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin
bombing in five minutes.” While this was
a joke, Reagan was well aware of what he was doing and what he was saying. Some have suggested that this is what President
Trump is imitating now and his boisterous speech is a rhetorical tool
embracing Kissinger’s theory.
MAD is an effective deterrent if both countries are rational
and are not truly seeking self-destruction. While Kim Jong Un may not be
seeking self-destruction, it is unclear whether he is fully against it. This increases the element of fear and
instability, North Korea could be utilizing nuclear weapons to bolster its
position internationally or it could truly be seeking their use. On balance, it
is not clear if President Trump is attempting the “madman” theory or if he is going
beyond the use of nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool as well. MAD will remain
a relevant military strategy so long as neither side is suicidal.
[1]
Suri, Jeremi, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of Global Conflict since
1945”;
Canadian
International Council 63, no. 4 (2008): 13.
