My very first piece for this blog explored the
fact that covert
warfare is becoming, or even has become, the
international standard for conducting hostilities. And with the President of
the United States granting the CIA authority to conduct
lethal drone strikes once again, it seems that the United
States is committed to wage these hostilities further and further away from the
obligations within traditional modes of conflict.
The new rules reportedly once again allow CIA
supervisors managing the covert operations to give the clearance for drone
strikes. The previous administration placed drone strike activity under
Pentagon control, and only then under limited capacity outside direct military
action. Now, the United States is returning to an original framework regarding CIA
having exclusive authority to conduct drone strikes independent of executive
need to be in the know.
This shift is legally important both domestically
and internationally. Targeted killings done by drones from the CIA fall under Title 50
of the United States Code, while the Department of Defense use is governed by Title 10
and includes far more restrictive and oversighted procedures. But more than
that, as former Marine Corps Lawyer and Georgetown law professor Gary Solis has
mentioned
many times, “CIA agents are, unlike their military counterparts but like the
fighters they target, unlawful combatants.” And there arises the concerning
issue.
International law is sorely lacking on issues of
espionage, namely because espionage is conducted as state practice. Most laws
relevant to spying are domestic in nature. No state desires to bind its
capacities to spy based on a treaty. The rules of espionage and proper conduct
by intelligence communities develop as customary international law by state
practice. This makes it so much more important to scrutinize new practice
techniques of the intelligence communities. Left alone long enough, they become
the acceptable practice for states.
But international law does provide the per se
illegality of intentional killing by those lacking combatant privilege. By
shifting authority back to the CIA to conduct drone strikes, the United States
is moving away from internationally defensible and accepted norms regarding the
conduct of hostilities. This will only further international condemnation of
illegal use of strikes abroad, not just on grounds of violation of sovereignty,
but now so on grounds of unprivileged combatants. But this is not to say that
the United States does not have a legal argument at its disposal.
Footnote
44 of the OLC Awlaki memorandum provides what is
yet the best argument regarding CIA drone usage. Quoting eminent scholar
Richard Baxter, the United States takes the position that it is important to
not be confused with “acts punishable under international law and acts with
respect to which international law affords no protection.” Strictly speaking,
international law does not prohibit civilians from taking direct part in
hostilities. Granted, it won’t convey combatant’s privilege upon them either.
This footnote goes on to say, “lethal activities conducted in accord with the
laws of war…do not violate the laws of war by virtue of the fact they are
carried out in part by government actors who are not entitled to the
combatant’s privilege.” And there does exist the incorporation doctrine of Article
43 Protocol I (applicable only to IACs and not the current
situation where CIA drone strikes most likely are to take place) which arguably
would grant privilege status to CIA operatives. But this means declaring the
CIA as a part of the military structure (something which would require a new
statutory charter for the CIA).
But why do we care? We care because of mistakes.
The laws of war, command responsibility, title 10, and the like all function to
ensure that the seriousness of actions taken in war are rooted to an individual
we can charge and punish; title 50, the lacking laws on espionage, and the CIA
do not. This means the shift allows for a greater latitude of drone usage with
an almost impossibility for assigning responsibility for prosecution.
It may not matter as to the results on whether a
drone strike is conducted by a military unit or the CIA. The analysis to engage
in hostilities will very much be the same according to the laws of war. But we
should all be concerned on moves that reduce personal responsibility for
actions in war. Drones, first, work to decrease and impersonalize the acts of
war, and now CIA usage further hides responsibility behind a screen. I do not
know where this will lead in practice, but we should all be concerned at making
the ability to unleash the violence of war accessible to civil analysists who
certainly would experience tunnel vision on the importance level of the
targeted actor. Causalities will only rise because of this.