Civilian casualties are an unfortunate and yet expected part
of the collateral damage incurred during armed conflict. Nations in the international community, however,
have nonetheless gone to great lengths to ensure that civilian casualties not
be written off. A recent article
on Defense One explains that the Trump Administration plans potential relaxing
of the rules meant to limit civilian casualties in counter-terrorist
operations. This would mean that “areas
of active hostilities” would have fewer rules of engagement, especially in
conducting drone strikes and counterterrorism missions outside conventional war
zones. This is not a new practice;
President Obama issued a similar
declaration in Libya which involved a prolonged air campaign that drove
ISIS from the city of Sirte. The Trump
Administration’s plan would only
be temporarily removing constraints on airstrikes and raids with the intent
to target individuals suspected of being militants, and the initial plan would
serve as a test to determine if the government can more broadly extend the
relaxed rules of engagement.
Allowing a greater range of air
strikes and raids has previously proven effective in driving terrorist fighters
out of cities and hiding. Generally,
States must
distinguish between military objectives and non-military objectives for targetability,
and under international humanitarian law and customary international law, civilians are never targetable. So long as civilians are not the principle
object of the attack, however, collateral
damage to civilians is often justifiable following a proportionality
analysis to determine whether the military advantage gained outweighs the
loss of civilian life and property. If
the military advantage gained does not outweigh the loss of civilian life, the
campaign cannot continue. The United
States could easily make the argument, and be well supported by individuals on
both sides of the aisle, that the distinct military advantage of eliminating
terrorist group presence in these cities is a significant advantage not only
for the United States but also for the other countries engaging ISIS.
There
are two fundamental reasons why such an approach could be a strategic nightmare
for the United States. First and foremost,
if the United States loosens the rules of engagement regarding civilian
casualties it will not be incompliance with international humanitarian law or
customary international law. Both
indicate that civilians may not be the direct object of a military attack.
Second, continuing to relax the rules of
engagement in relation to civilians could severely jeopardize the United States’
mission in fighting ISIS. If the United
States hopes to succeed in the conflict in the Middle East, it must have the
support of the American people and nations, specifically those within the
war-torn regions. If civilians are the
constant indirect or direct target of attack, the United States will fail to
maintain any good-will relations that have been built. The people in these regions have been ravaged
by war for years and civilian
casualties are already excessive. For
example, in
Yemen, one of the countries already declared to be an “area of active
hostilities” there is a significant number of civilian casualties. If this trend continues, the United States
could risk upsetting the delicate relations between itself and the people of
these war-torn countries by becoming the main force of their suffering. The United States must maintain its role as
protector rather than attacker.
While
expanding the rules of engagement could have the effect of successfully
eliminating more terrorist fighters and threats, it could have the extremely
dangerous effect of turning the civilian population against the United
States. Abiding by the customary rules
of engagement will enable the United States to maintain the moral high-ground
in the continuous fight against terrorism both domestically and
internationally.